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J.R. Morris’s paper is intended as a philosophical reflection on how to possibly 
address in a most appropriate and favourable way the issue of acknowledging and 
assessing the argumentative characteristics of narrative discourse. It does not get to 
the point of providing a personal theoretical account of narrative argument as such 
or how it actually works nor is it its intention. It tackles instead certain preliminary 
problems and explicit caveats regarding the interest for argumentation theorists to 
involve in such a kind of research. As I am now deeply interested in this issue, as my 
own paper in this conference (unambiguously entitled “Narration as argument”) 
indicates, I have found Morris’s work especially appealing. It has also helped me to 
take a look at certain problems of the theoretical framework in which we may be 
able to think about narrative argumentation which I had myself somewhat 
overlooked. I must finally admit that I openly sympathize with his “use-based” 
approach and his empirical and contextual concerns regarding the study of the 
practices of arguing. I am, consequently, a rather already persuaded reader and 
commentator, especially as regards his overall conclusion about the intrinsic 
interest, value and virtues (as opposed to weaknesses and risks) of narrative 
argument. However, let me point out certain issues which I think could be better 
clarified in his paper. 
 Morris starts commenting on the pitfalls of excessively narrow and too 
theoretical or abstract definitions of discursive categories such as “narrative”, 
suggesting instead that we embrace a more empirical, “use-based” approach, 
following Wittgenstein’s maxim regarding the study of language: “Don’t ask for the 
meaning, ask for the use”. As I’m not very fond myself neither of analytic definitions 
nor of philosophical theories based on them, I again concede the general point. I 
would suggest, nonetheless, that, instead of referring this topic to the old and all-
embracing discussions about “nominalism” (as Morris does in note 1), he could 
make use of the ideas of a very interesting Uruguayan philosopher from the 
beginning of the 20th century, Carlos Vaz Ferreira, who is now precisely being 
vindicated by some people working in argumentation theory (Vega Reñón 2008); 
Spanish speaking people, I admit, as he is not yet translated into English. My 
comment is, therefore, just a suggestion for further reading not the mention of any 
obvious omission. In his Lógica viva (2008 [1910]), Vaz Ferreira develops a theory 
about “paralogisms” (as he calls them) as risky habits of reasoning, some of which 
are not precisely typical of uneducated people but just the opposite. In this respect, 
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he talks about the risks of “false precision” and especially about the opposition 
between “thinking (and reasoning, and arguing) within a system” vs. “thinking with 
ideas to take into account” (“Pensar por sistemas, y pensar por ideas para tener en 
cuenta”, pp. 130-151). The argumentative interests of Vaz Ferreira may help us 
focus the wider issue of the philosophical problems of definitions within our own 
field and topics of interest.  
 In this same sense, Morris’s use of the literature on narratology which 
exposes its own problems about the definition of its subject matter, “narrative”, may 
have somehow blurred for him (or so it seems in certain paragraphs) what I see as 
“our own” definitional problem. To make myself clear, my intuition is that the 
problems Govier and Ayers (2012) get into while trying to asses narrative 
arguments are not exactly due to their definition of narration (as Morris claims) but 
primarily to their narrow definition of argument and their treatment of narration 
under such an argumentative theoretical paradigm. 
Now Morris claims that by analyzing “narratives in use” we will be able to 
capture the dynamic characteristics of this kind of discourse “as an activity and not 
as a static product” (again a point I fully endorse). However, the paper does not 
make clear to me whether Morris’s aim is to consider, in a flexible, open and 
empirically relevant way, what narrative is or becomes in such uses or to find out in 
which cases it has a particularly argumentative import. I like very much his 
quotation from Klapproth (2004, p. 10) suggesting that what is “narratable might 
vary widely from one culture to another”, but I think that in argumentation studies 
we should go a step further and look for argumentatively relevant uses of narration. 
Morris also engages in the topic about the supposedly marginal position of 
narrative arguments in comparison to “linear, logical, abstract forms of reasoning” 
(Rooney 2010, p. 218) that have been the privileged focus of mainstream 
argumentation theory. Narratives and narrative arguments have been, in this 
respect, related to certain genres of discourse belonging to underprivileged groups, 
as women, children, poor, undereducated, exotic people; i.e. everything that might 
be opposed to the male, white, western, ruling and dominant classes. To be able to 
analyze and assess narrative argumentation would, therefore, help us not to neglect 
these areas of discourse and discursive agents. It would help us liberate from a 
colonizing, imperialistic discursive focus. Towards the end of the paper Morris 
claims, consistently, that “narrative has the potential to equip marginalized 
individuals”. This may well be so, but I am not sure we should assume it without 
further discussion nor as so generalized a rule (a kind of one-size-fits-all rule), 
before we have relevant and contextualized empirical results; much less being 
precisely an idea belonging to the colonizing mainstream discourse that narrative is 
thus humbly situated within the space of reasons. I would rather challenge the very 
roots of this assumption, as narrative, I think, is much more intrinsic to all 
discursive practices and at all social and cultural levels as the interest in a good 
account of narratio of the ancient rhetoricians (not precisely talking to the 
underprivileged) may illustrate (Olmos 2012). 
It is just a mirage, I think, to find anything intrinsically feminine or humble in 
narration. A mirage produced by a wrong self-image of the powerful discourses 
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claiming of themselves that they do not use such persuasive means while obviously 
doing it.   
If there is, nevertheless, still room for certain approaches based on the idea 
that narrativity may be a discursive means that rather encourages communion vs. 
adversariality (and this could be so, I admit, in certain contexts), I think, in any case, 
that these aspects should not be part of our initial picture of narrative argument 
because we could be narrowing our lens too much. I would ask for a more neutral 
starting point in this respect. Gilbert’s ideas on intersectionality (2007) could be 
very useful for it, and I was glad to find them here. Specially the “call for letting go of 
one-size-fits all approach to the analysis of argument”. A broader approach to our 
way of defining argument and argumentation practices (as I suggested above) 
would allow us to make room for a more congenial account of narrative discourse, 
without assuming too much about what we will find in it. 
In the last part of the paper, Morris comes to criticise Govier and Ayers’ 
(2012) article on parables and narrative arguments; most especially their 
contention that offering arguments through narrations may have “more risks than 
benefits, from an epistemic point of view” (p. 188). Morris mentions their notion of 
good reason, something for which we should be attentive, and the way they talk 
about the “charm of the story” as capable of lowering our wits for logical 
assessment. In order to identify a suitable philosophical framework supporting such 
hygienic ideas Morris recurs to Fisher’s (1987) reconstruction of the “rational-world 
paradigm” assuming that within such a rigid paradigm it is understandable that 
finally Govier and Ayers come to their conclusion. He also suggests that, when 
assesing narrative arguments, Govier and Ayers are probably just thinking about 
one among the possible arguing practices, in this case Walton’s “persuasion 
dialogue” (and in a particularly rationalistic account of it). In order to attain a 
different conclusion, Morris seems to suggest, we just have to think in other kinds of 
settings, and he quotes Dal Cin, et al’s (2004) assessment of the persuasive powers 
of narrative argumentation in certain context where it might work “under the 
radar”. 
Now for all my sympathies with a rhetorical approach to argumentation that 
would take into account “effectiveness” as an important parameter in argument 
analysis, I would not be willing to concede so much to logicians about the  “under 
the radar” workings of narration, suggesting it, somehow, skips rationality. I would 
rather try to reconstruct an alternative account of what is rational or reasonable to 
take as a good reason. In this sense, rather than presenting Fisher’s account of the 
traditional “rational-paradigm” which is, in fact, his target, Morris could have made 
use of his alternative proposal of a “narrative paradigm of human rationality”. If we 
do so, we could aspire to an account that would defend narrative as a rational 
enough means to argument, providing good enough reasons in the adequate 
contexts; an endeavour for which we can count on the help of a long-standing 
tradition.  
Morris’s paper has helped me to situate my own interests in narrative 
arguments within a wider framework of philosophical assumptions and I am very 
grateful for it. I fully endorse his call for intersectional analysis and empirical 
research on argumentative practices. A use-based approach, I am sure, would help 
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us a lot in understanding what is happening in different argumentative settings; so 
let us stick to it and not assume too many of the thesis endorsed by those who have 
a very different approach. 
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